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Introduction 
 
The first decade of the 21st century has seen an unprecedented awareness by Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) elites of the need to rethink their states’ socio-economic 
structures, in order to address challenges of political and economic sustainability. Thus, 
while high oil prices arguably reduced the pressure to diversify in the 1970s, the period 
of high oil prices during the 2000s instead coincided with changes in the role of the 
state, economic diversification policies, and reforms in labour markets. This has had 
major implications for the whole social contract in these states, and more particularly 
for the relations of the business sector with the political authority. This paper focusses 
on the business elites’ positions, perceptions and role in the economic, social and 
political decisions implemented by the regimes. In particular, it aims at shedding new 
light on the role of the business actors for the stability and legitimacy of the system and 
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ruling elites (especially after the Arab Spring). 
 
The state-business relationship in the Gulf monarchies 
 
Prior to the influx of major oil revenues, domestic stability in the monarchies of the 
Arabian Peninsula was insured by an arrangement linking rulers and local merchant 
families, who helped provide the rulers’ financial needs, receiving in return political 
influence and protection of their economic interests. The merchants remained key 
partners until the surge in oil revenues accruing directly to the rulers from the 1950s. 
The historical alliance between merchants and rulers was disrupted by the unexpected 
material sufficiency of the rulers, after oil was discovered. The rulers were thus freed 
from their economic dependence on the merchants. The state monopoly on managing 
expenditure and development allowed the creation of a welfare state which became the 
cornerstone of the ruling families’ political legitimacy. In effect this created a new social 
contract. The state distributed oil rent through free education, free health care and 
high-salaried government jobs; granted key political and administrative positions to 
historically-important tribes or families and economic monopolies to nationals; and 
introduced practices and laws which gave nationals rights and privileges which were not 
enjoyed by non-nationals. In return, the ruling families expected the non-interference of 
nationals and civil society in domestic politics. Thus, in the Gulf, the terms of the 
famous formula (“no taxation without representation,” raised during the United States’ 
Independence war by supporters of political liberalisation) have been reversed to 
become: “no representation without taxation”. 
Jill Crystal explains that the development of oil production in Kuwait and 
Qatar forced the merchants to renounce their historical claim to participate in 
decision-making;1 in exchange, the rulers granted them a large share of oil revenues. 
While in Kuwait the ruler was forced to promise to keep royal family members out of 
business, in Qatar, because the merchant community was weaker and smaller, the ruler 
allowed his relatives into the merchants’ economic territory. If eventual confusion of 
political and economic actors can be seen in Qatar, it is explained by the intrusion of 
ruling family members into economy, but also by the exclusion of merchants from the 
decision-making sphere. The same situation can be observed to a large extent in the 
UAE. The interrelations between the business elite and ruling families did not result in 
                                                 
1 Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
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any demands for economic or political change. In fact, merchants were more concerned 
with their own economic interests, and their limited political interests were focused 
solely on the condition that ruling families should use their political power to stop 
foreign merchants from competing in the private sector. In return, members of the ruling 
families involved merchant families in the running and managing of their businesses. 
In Bahrain the business elite has been heavily dependent both on the balance of 
power within the royal family (Al Khalifa) and on its good relationship with the most 
influential individuals among the royal family, who monopolizes the important and most 
sensitive ministries. If a number of Bahrani2 merchant families were historical allies of 
the Al Khalifas (such as the al-Baharna, al-Urayyid, and Rajab families), the Bahraini 
business elite is mainly composed of Sunni families, either of Najdi background or 
Hawala.3 Given that this merchant elite view themselves as a minority and that their 
influence is not based on deep social networks, they have never been powerful enough 
to force the ruling family to stay out of business—as is the case in Kuwait. As a result, 
the Al Khalifa family has never had to grant a substantial number of leading positions in 
the decision-making field to the economic elite, and it retains extensive political room 
for maneuver vis-à-vis the merchants. Moreover, the Al Khalifas themselves have 
always been substantially involved in business. Indeed, the Al Khalifa family was the 
first beneficiary of the oil wealth:  
The wealth of the state has been the Al Khalifas’ to distribute as largesse 
to grateful citizens… Most of the land on the island belongs to the 
Al Khalifa family and there has been no institutional accountability of the 
family to the public…since the suspension of the parliament [in 1975].4 
In the 1990s, Prime Minister Shaykh Khalifa “allegedly became the richest 
person in Bahrain with extensive holdings in land, hotels, commercial property, and 
                                                 
2 The Baharina (sing. Bahrani) are the indigenous Shi‘i Arabs in Bahrain. All Shi‘a — both 
indigenous and of Persian origin— are considered to be 60 percent of the national population. 
33 The Hawala are Sunnis that migrated to Bahrain starting in the nineteenth century from the 
Iranian coast but claim Arab origins. An example of one of these merchant families historically close 
to the al-Khalifas is the Kanoo family, who moved to Bahrain from southern Persia in the 
mid-nineteenth century. Yusif Kanoo, who began as a small merchant in 1890 trading with India, 
became in the 1920s and 1930s the largest banker on the island and the Bahrain agent of companies 
such as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and Ford. In the 1950s and 1960s, the House of Kanoo 
evolved into a conglomerate of companies, with headquarters in Bahrain, Dammam, and Dubai. The 
Kanoo group of companies is currently one of the largest family-owned groups of companies in the 
Gulf. 
4 Graham E. Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke, The Arab Shi‘a: The Forgotten Muslims (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 125. 
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profits on government contracts.”5 
The shaping of the labour market reform implemented in the 2000s is a superb 
illustration of the power struggle within the ruling family, between what a lot of 
observers labelled as the “old guard”, around the Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa, the 
Cabinet and the prominent business families and their arm (the Chamber of Commerce) 
on one hand, and the new generation of technocrats led by the Crown Prince Sheikh 
Salman and the unaccountable Economic Development Board (EDB), created by royal 
decree in 2001. In 2004 the American McKinsey consultant firm was commissioned by 
the Crown Prince to draft a comprehensive long-term economic programme for Bahrain. 
Following McKinsey’s recommendations, the EDB was given the overall responsibility 
for outlining, proposing and managing the economic reforms for Bahrain in a 
comprehensive manner—including education, labour, tourism, industry and healthcare 
The philosophy of the reform was to deregulate and liberalize the job market and 
redress the imbalance between the local and cheap expatriate workforce6 in order to 
address the structural causes of unemployment of nationals. It included gradually 
phasing out the Bahrainization quotas, allowing easier termination procedures of 
Bahraini employees and replacing them with a fee-based system under which employers 
pay a BD75 monthly fee per expatriate worker and a BD600 visa issuing and renewing 
fee per worker for each two-year period in order to bring the cost of local and expatriate 
labor force in line. 
The private sector did not spare in its efforts to make its voice heard by the 
EDB—not only through informal channels and lobbying to the King and the Prime 
Minister, but also through repeated public demonstrations outside the Parliament to 
pressure the authorities and attract the support of the representatives. One of the 
“privileged” addressees of this lobbying was the Prime Minister, in whom the private 
sector knew it had an understanding interlocutor. The business community successfully 
pushed for cutting the fees so that an agreement was finally reached in 2007: BD10 per 
month per expatriate plus a BD200 visa renewing fee for each two-year period. 
Interestingly, the scope of action of the private sector in Bahrain was only indirect, as it 
responded and adapted to the evolution of the balance of power among the Al Khalifas. 
In Oman, unlike the other Gulf monarchies, the country is not under the rule of a 
                                                 
5 John E. Peterson, “Bahrain: Reform, Promise and Reality,” Political Liberalization in the Persian 
Gulf, Joshua Teitelbaum, ed. (London: Hurst, 2009), 158. 
6 In 2006, 46 percent of expatriates working in the private sector, but only 1.1 percent of Bahrainis, 
earned less than BD100 per month (Personal calculation based on table 2.1.15.2 available at 
http://blmi.lmra.bh/otherdata/surveytables/mi_surveydata.xml; BD1 = USD2.66). 
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tribe or a family, but under that of a man, who has constantly shown his determination 
to keep control of all matters in the country. Because Sultan Qaboos has never been 
willing to rely on his small family, he has allied with the merchant elites, a practice in 
keeping with the pre-1970 period. Never, until the late 1990s, were the Omani 
merchants “forced to choose money over formal political influence,”7 as in states like 
Kuwait and Qatar. Thus some of the pre-eminent merchant families’ members have been 
given strategic positions to secure public contracts and control over the distribution of 
the oil wealth. To a certain extent, the ruler has been more dependent on the business 
elite for the stability of the regime than the merchants have been on the ruler for 
developing their economic assets. 
At the same time, oil revenues profoundly changed the boundaries between 
politics and the economy, as many ministers whose families were previously not active 
in the economy become personally rich. Qaboos did not question this process, as it both 
increased the dependency of the elites on the state and the stability of his rule. The 
symbolic debts owed by Qaboos at the beginning of his rule to these key players who 
supported him after 1970 thus gradually turned into a weapon in his hands, forestalling 
any challenges to his reign by turning the most powerful societal forces into unfailing 
allies. On the eve of the 2011 Arab Spring, few members of the Omani Council of 
Ministers had not personally derived material profit from oil revenue. One of the most 
illustrative cases is the noble branch of the Khalili family—heirs to a prestigious lineage 
of Ibadi imams who opposed the Sultans of Muscat until the 1950s. Sa‘ud al-Khalili, the 
nephew of the Imam of Oman Muhammad al-Khalili (1920-54), became one of the four 
members of Qaboos’ first Cabinet appointed in August 1970. He is also the founder 
(1973) and owner of the powerful business group Al Taher, which is active in 
construction contracting (Caterpillar), food and drink (Sprite and Coke), and the 
distribution of Shell products. His nephew, Salim bin Hilal, Minister for Agriculture 
until 2011, was formerly chairman of the Chamber of Commerce, while another of his 
nephews, ‘Abd al-Malik bin ‘Abd Allah, who had previously held successively the 
positions of executive chairman of the Royal Court Pension Fund, of chairman of the 
first Omani banking group, Bank Muscat, and of Minister for Tourism (2011-2012), is 
currently Minister of Justice. 
Political debates in Oman over the necessity to rethink the economic model of 
development based on oil revenue are not new. The economic slowdown in the 1980s, 
                                                 
7 Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 195. 
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combined with the emergence of endemic unemployment among the younger 
generations, led to the implementation of Omanization policies favoring nationals in 
employment. In June 1995 a long-term program entitled “Oman 2020: Vision for 
Oman’s Economy,” was approved by Sultan Qaboos. Two series of objectives were set 
out. The first was economic diversification: the oil sector’s share of GDP had to fall 
from 41 percent in 1996 to nine percent by 2020, while that of non-oil industries was to 
increase from 7.5 to 29 percent. The second objective had to do with human resources 
and employment. It planned to raise the proportion of nationals in the public and private 
sectors from 68 to 95 percent and from 7.5 to 75 percent, respectively, while the share 
of expatriates in the whole population would be reduced from 25 percent in 1995 to 15 
percent by 2020. The new Labor Law, issued by royal decree on 26 April 2003, 
illustrated these priorities. Under this law, employers had to obtain permits from the 
Ministry of Manpower to bring in foreign workers only if there were not enough 
Omanis available for the post and if the company had complied with the prescribed 
percentage of Omanization in its branch (Article 18). Once the company was granted 
the permit, a non-Omani, to qualify for a job, could obtain a labor card issued by the 
Ministry (for a duration decided by the Ministry) on the condition that the worker had 
the professional skill or the qualifications required by the position and that the 
prescribed labor card fees had been paid by the company (Articles 18 and 19). Moreover, 
under this law nationals enjoy a set of social measures that expatriates do not, including 
a minimum wage (OR200 for a full-time unskilled job8) and strict protection against 
dismissal. Indeed, an employer can terminate the contract of an Omani only during the 
three-month probation period (Article 24) or under two other conditions—if the 
employee absents himself from work for more than seven consecutive days or more 
than ten days during one year without justification, or if the employee makes a major 
mistake (Article 40). Thus, the challenge of employing young Omanis, of whom 50,000 
every year leave school and university (with or without degrees) and enter the labor 
market, led to national mobilization driven from above, with the Omanization policy 
being the main emphasis. 
In comparison to similar policies in neighboring countries, the Sultanate can be 
proud of undeniable successes, at least quantitatively. By the end of 2005, the number of 
active expatriates in the private sector stabilized, while the rate of nationals in the 
private sector and the overall rate of Omanization (public and private sectors, excluding 
                                                 
8 The minimum wage consists of OR180 as a basic salary plus OR20 as transport and housing fees 
(as of March 2011). 
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security and defense forces) increased from 15 percent and 28 percent, respectively, in 
2003, to 19 percent and 32 percent two years later. In December 2009 the civil service 
sector showed an average Omanization rate of 85.6 percent, a figure that had 
consistently risen during the decade. Moreover, 91 percent of employees in the private 
banking sector were Omani. Nevertheless, these increases were not enough to hide 
structural difficulties due to the policy. In 2005, civil servants of the Ministry for 
Manpower spoke privately of 300,000 job seekers9—an unemployment rate around 25 
per cent. 
The fact that most cabinet members are involved directly or indirectly in 
business explains why the quota-based labour market policy could not be maintained in 
the long term. These decision-makers had to avoid questions about their supposed 
promotion of the nation’s interests (such as the Omanization policy) versus the 
particular interests they were defending as businessmen. The major Omani business 
families who control the Chamber of Commerce and are represented in the Cabinet 
were strategically positioned to express their disagreement with the labor market policy 
to the ruler and thus to advocate for changes in long-term policy. But even more 
significantly, they were positioned to prevent the emergence of newcomers in business 
and alternative voices from the private sector. The Omani authorities focused on 
economic liberalization in the second half of the 2000s by giving prominence to 
national and foreign private capital, even if it meant the emergence of lasting inflation 
and an acceptance of a pause in the Omanization employment policy. For example, the 
new tax system that came into force in January 2010 cancelled the distinction between 
local and foreign companies by establishing a fixed tax rate on profits of 12 percent for 
all companies (both local and foreign) after an initial tax-free exemption of profits of 
OR30,000. In January 2006 Oman signed a bilateral free trade agreement with the 
United States, which came into effect in January 2009; many services are excluded from 
it in order to preserve the local network of small and medium-sized enterprises in the 
Sultanate, and Omanization requirements are still valid, even in the sectors covered by 
the agreement. 
As a consequence of this strategic U-turn, the Omanization rate in the private 
sector decreased dramatically after 2006. This can be explained by the fact that the 
number of active expatriates exploded—particularly due to the need for foreign workers 
to labor on construction and infrastructure projects. 
                                                 
9 Personal interview, Muscat, 30 August 2005. 
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The economic liberalisation policies implemented in the 2000s directly entered 
into conflict with simultaneous labour market reforms favouring employment of 
nationals in the private sector. Outcomes of concomitant policies of privatisation and 
economic liberalization (which mainly benefit already leading actors) and 
nationalisation of private sector jobs (which directly damages these interests) are 
reliable indicators of the nature of relationship between the state and the business elite, 
and especially of the different role that the business elite has played in shaping the 
reforms’ outputs. 
 
The business elite and the Arab Spring 
 
Even if political grievances were crucial in the protests which took place in the GCC 
countries after 2011 (such as the implementation of constitutional monarchies in Kuwait, 
Bahrain or Oman, guaranteeing the separation of the three executive, legislative and 
judicial powers, or the end of sectarian discriminations in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain), 
social and economic demands have been at the top of the demonstrations’ agenda in all 
GCC countries, revolving around job opportunities, pro-active measures to curb rising 
inequalities, and to fight corruption among top officials. In particular, official figures 
cannot hide endemic unemployment among young nationals (maybe except in Qatar and 
Abu Dhabi). 
If anything, the 2011 protests in the Gulf are revealing of the economic 
resistance to change, i.e. the business elites’ inclination to privilege the political status 
quo over any kind of reform debate, and the extent to which the interests of the main 
business actors are intrinsically linked to those of the authoritarian rule. The business 
elite, accused of corruption, unwarranted privileges and political and economic 
opposition to change, has been one of the main targets of the protesters. From this 
perspective, it is not insignificant that early attempts by the Omani ruler to show his 
supposed benevolence towards the protestors led to an extensive reshuffle of the cabinet 
in March 2011, with the removal of long-serving ministers widely perceived as 
embodying corruption and conflict of interests between business and politics (such as 
Ahmed Makki, the Minister for National Economy; and Maqbool Al-Sultan, the 
Minister for Commerce and Industry). The fact that demonstrations were particularly 
active in the town of Sohar, conceived as the international showcase of the economic 
liberalisation of the country, is highly symbolic too. The transition of Sohar within a few 
years from a small sleepy provincial town into the industrial capital of the country led to 
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a disruption of the social structures. This badly-digested economic boom benefited 
above all a handful of local notables, who have taken advantage of the dramatic rise in 
land prices, as well as the Omani top business groups (Omar Zawawi Establishment, 
National Trading Co., Zubayr, WJ Towell, Bahwan, etc. in partnership with foreign 
investors) and members of the royal family (including the ruler’s first cousin and 
Minister for Heritage and Culture sayyid Haytham, through the holding company for 
investment and project development National Trading Co. he owns and chairs) already 
embedded in the heart of the political-economic decision process—while the majority of 
the local population had no access to the fruits of economic development, and 
experienced a stagnation or a diminution of their living standards, due to increase of 
costs.10 The dismantlement of the Ministry of National Economy in March 2011 and 
the announcement of social and economic measures (such as the creation of public 
sector jobs for nationals; the sharp increase of public allowances or of salaries in public 
and private sectors) that openly contradict the liberalisation policies implemented for a 
decade illustrates the dilemma in which the Omani leadership finds itself. The 
fundamental question regarding the regime’s future relates to the political-economic 
conflict of interest at the top levels in the country, i.e. the fact that the business elite is in 
charge of economic policies. While this elite has held the levers of power since 1970 
and has predominantly benefited from the oil rent, this oligarchic pact has become 
unacceptable for a new generation who are calling into question the whole economic 
structure on which authoritarian Oman has relied under Qaboos. 
In Bahrain, except some isolated cases who sympathised with the protesters in 
2011, business actors have constantly reasserted their proximity with the regime and the 
necessity to preserve the stability of the country – as an allusion to the protesters 
considered as troublemakers. In a statement on 11 May 2011 referring to the Peninsula 
Shield Force military intervention in Bahrain, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(BCCI) explained that “due to the timely measures taken by the leadership and the 
support of neighbouring GCC countries to ensure security and stability in the country, 
the [national] economy is back on track.”11 A few days earlier, it had called on “all 
business enterprises and owners in Bahrain” for a complete boycott of trade with Iran to 
                                                 
10 For more details on the Arab Spring in Oman, and the socio-economic unrest in Sohar since 2011, 
see Marc Valeri, “Simmering Unrest and Succession Challenges in Oman,” Carnegie Paper, January 
2015. 
11 Bahrain Chamber of Commerce, “BCCI’s Call for Consolidated Efforts to Revive the Economy,” 
11 May 2011. Available at 
http://www.bahrainchamber.org.bh/en/ViewNews.aspx?nid=601. 
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protest against Tehran’s alleged fuelling of unrest in Bahrain.12 Even more, the massive 
crackdown that followed the protests in 2011 has once again changed the balance 
among the ruling family, and proven successful in marginalising the less 
uncompromising component of the Al Khalifa, around the Crown Prince and the EDB, 
in favour of the Prime Minister and his supporters, first among them the Chamber of 
Commerce and the business elite. Both the EDB-led reforms until 2011 and the new 
balance of power among the Al Khalifas since then have confirmed that the royal family 
is still the decisive economic and political force. Contrary to Oman, where the ruler 
cannot rely on his small family and has allied with the merchant elite, which has been 
given political positions to secure public contracts and determine long-term economic 
policies, the Bahraini business sector has to press for its interests in dealing carefully 
with the evolving balance of power among the ruling family. It has to make use of the 
divisions within it in a much more tactical and noisier way than it is the case in Oman, 
where the 2011 protests and the widespread social frustration have not put an end yet to 
the direct interference of the bourgeoisie in the decision-making process. 
In the UAE, it was not surprising not to see any business elites signing the 
petition submitted in March 2011 to the government by 100 intellectuals demanding 
more legislative power to the elected Federal National Council. These elites sided with 
the government and, if anything, showed more support to the leadership than before. 
Business elite continue to benefit from the status quo, and support the government’s 
economic and political policies. This pattern of state-business relations remains a 
prominent feature in the UAE – and to an even wider extent in Qatar, where the ruling 
family controls directly or indirectly the vast majority of the emirate’s economy and 
where non-Al Thani business elite content themselves to adapt and jump on the 
bandwagon. In Kuwait, where members of the merchant families historically played a 
significant role in reform movements, especially before the independence, the business 
sector has unambiguously sided with the regime since 2011 to oppose any popular 
demands which could alter the political status quo, and as a consequence, damage their 
rent-seeking interests. 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Sandeep Singh Grewal, ‘Boycott Iranian Products,’ Gulf Daily News (1 May 2011). BCCI 
treasurer ‘Uthman Sharif said this call “reflects an economic decision highlighting [the BCCI’s] 
support to the Bahrain government and rulers.” 
